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Aboriginal Title and the Provinces 
after Tsilhqot’in Nation 
Kent McNeil* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its groundbreaking decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia,1 the Supreme Court for the first time issued a declaration of 
Aboriginal title. The Court’s unanimous judgment, written by McLachlin 
C.J.C., clarified the test for exclusive occupation that has to be met for an 
Aboriginal group to establish Aboriginal title at the time of Crown 
assertion of sovereignty.2 The Court rejected the site-specific approach 
applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, opting instead for a 
territorial approach that takes account of the patterns of land use and 
control by semi-nomadic Aboriginal peoples such as the Tsilhqot’in. The 
Court also affirmed Lamer C.J.C.’s description of Aboriginal title in 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia3 as a sui generis interest in land, 
entitling the titleholders to exclusive occupation and use. In Tsilhqot’in 
Nation, McLachlin C.J.C. put it this way: 
Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated 
with fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be 
used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to 
possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the 
right to pro-actively use and manage the land.4 
                                                                                                                       
*  Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. I am grateful to John Borrows, Kathy Simo, Kerry 
Wilkins, and an anonymous reviewer for reading a draft of this article and providing me with very 
helpful comments. 
1  [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in Nation”]. 
2  See Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal Title”, forthcoming 
(2015) 48:3 U.B.C. L. Rev. 
3  [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
4  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 73. 
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But unlike fee simple, Aboriginal title is inalienable other than by 
surrender to the Crown,5 and is subject to an inherent limit, namely that 
the land cannot be used in ways that would deprive future generations of 
the benefit of the land.6 However, in Tsilhqot’in Nation the inherent limit 
underwent a significant modification: instead of preserving the land for 
the traditional uses relied upon to establish title, which is the way it was 
expressed in Delgamuukw, in Tsilhqot’in Nation McLachlin C.J.C.’s 
emphasis was on sustainability and respect for Aboriginal peoples’ 
authority to make their own decisions about the best uses of their land. 
“[L]ike other landowners,” she said, “Aboriginal title holders of modern 
times can use their land in modern ways, if that is their choice”, as long 
as the land is not “developed or misused in a way that would 
substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land”.7 
Moreover, the inherent limit applies to governments as well that try to 
justify infringements of Aboriginal title: 
[T]he Crown’s fiduciary duty means that the government must act in a 
way that respects the fact that Aboriginal title is a group interest that 
inheres in present and future generations. The beneficial interest in the 
land held by the Aboriginal group vests communally in the title-holding 
group. This means that incursions on Aboriginal title cannot be 
justified if they would substantially deprive future generations of the 
benefit of the land.8 
The reformulation of the inherent limit and extension of it to non-
Aboriginal governments in Tsilhqot’in Nation are significant developments 
in the law relating to Aboriginal title.9 
Another major change in the law resulting from Tsilhqot’in Nation 
relates to the constitutional division of powers and provincial jurisdiction 
over Aboriginal title lands. This article discusses the nature and effect of  
 
                                                                                                                       
5  Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at para. 113; Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at paras. 15, 74.  
See Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47  
McGill L.J. 473. 
6  Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at paras. 125-132; Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at paras. 15, 74-75, 121. 
7  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 75, 74. At para. 121, McLachlin C.J.C. said 
the limit prevents uses that would “destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of 
Aboriginal peoples” (emphasis added). 
8  Id., at para. 86 (emphasis added). 
9  For critical discussion of the inherent limit prior to Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., see Kent 
McNeil, “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title”, in Kent McNeil, 
Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) [hereinafter “McNeil, Emerging Justice?”], 102 at 116-22. 
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this change in two distinct time periods: provincial authority and 
obligations prior to proof of Aboriginal title, and the application of 
provincial laws to Aboriginal title lands after Aboriginal title has been 
established. 
II. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATIONS PRIOR TO PROOF OF 
ABORIGINAL TITLE 
Aboriginal title claims over most of British Columbia have not yet 
been resolved by historical treaties, modern land claims agreements, or 
court decisions. Privately owned lands apart,10 most lands in the province 
are subject to conflicting claims by Aboriginal peoples and the Crown in 
right of the province. So what is the status of these lands and what is the 
extent of provincial authority over them prior to proof of Aboriginal 
title? 
According to Canadian law, the onus of proving Aboriginal title is 
on the Aboriginal claimants.11 As a result, lands that are subject to 
unproven Aboriginal title claims are presumed to be Crown lands.12 This 
presumption of Crown title, like most legal presumptions, is rebuttable, 
in this context by sufficient evidence of the Aboriginal title. In the 
meantime, the Crown cannot simply act as though it owns the land 
outright. In Haida Nation,13 the Supreme Court held that the Crown is 
honour-bound to take account of unproven Aboriginal claims of which it 
has actual or constructive notice, and to consult with the Aboriginal  
 
                                                                                                                       
10  In Tsilhqot’in Nation, privately owned lands were excluded from the claim area: see 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at para. 9; David M. Rosenberg, “10 Reasons Why the Tsilhqot’in 
Succeeded” (paper delivered at the Affinity Institute Conference, The SCC Tsilhqot’in Decision: 
Significance, Implications, and Practical Impact, Vancouver B.C., September 26, 2014), at 7. For 
discussion in relation to the trial decision, see Kent McNeil, “Reconciliation and Third Party 
Interests: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia” (2010) 8 Indigenous L.J. 7. See also Gordon 
Christie, “Aboriginal Title and Private Property” in Maria Morellato, ed., Aboriginal Law Since 
Delgamuukw (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2009), 177, and John Borrows, “Aboriginal Title and 
Private Property” (in this volume). 
11  Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at paras. 143-144; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 
25-26, 50. For criticism, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw 
v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537; Kent McNeil, “The Onus of Proof of 
Aboriginal Title” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 775, republished in McNeil, Emerging Justice?, 
supra, note 9, at 136. 
12  This appears to be taken for granted in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”]. 
13  Id. 
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claimants and accommodate their unproven interests in situations where 
the Crown contemplates action that may adversely affect those interests. 
Speaking for the whole Court in Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J.C. 
summed up the situation in forceful language: 
The Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over 
Aboriginal interests where claims affecting these interests are being 
seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof. It must 
respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests. The Crown is not 
rendered impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in question 
pending claims resolution. But, depending on the circumstances, 
discussed more fully below, the honour of the Crown may require it to 
consult with and reasonably accommodate Aboriginal interests pending 
resolution of the claim. To unilaterally exploit a claimed resource 
during the process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal claim to that 
resource, may be to deprive the Aboriginal claimants of some or all of 
the benefit of the resource. That is not honourable.14 
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Supreme Court affirmed and applied its 
decision in Haida Nation,15 holding that British Columbia had breached 
its duty to consult. Chief Justice McLachlin stated:  
The Crown’s duty to consult was breached when Crown officials 
engaged in the planning process for the removal of timber. The 
inclusion of timber on Aboriginal title land in a timber supply area, the 
approval of cut blocks on Aboriginal title land in a forest development 
plan, and the allocation of cutting permits all occurred without any 
meaningful consultation with the Tsilhqot’in.16 
However, given that this all occurred before Aboriginal title had 
been proven, the Court did not regard these actions as infringements of 
Aboriginal title. Chief Justice McLachlin distinguished between the 
procedural duties of consultation and accommodation that the Crown 
owes prior to proof of title, and the obligation to justify infringements of 
proven title: 
Where Aboriginal title is unproven, the Crown owes a procedural duty 
imposed by the honour of the Crown to consult and, if appropriate, 
accommodate the unproven Aboriginal interest. By contrast, where title 
has been established, the Crown must not only comply with its 
procedural duties, but must also ensure that the proposed government 
                                                                                                                       
14  Id., at para. 27. 
15  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 17, 78-80, 95-96. 
16  Id., at para. 96. 
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action is substantively consistent with the requirements of s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. This requires both a compelling and substantial 
governmental objective and that the government action is consistent 
with the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal group.17 
These guidelines were then applied by the Court to a specific 
provincial statute, namely the Forest Act.18 Chief Justice McLachlin 
appears to have regarded the application of this statute to Tsilhqot’in 
lands before title had been established as mainly a matter of statutory 
interpretation. As long as Aboriginal title is unproven and remains 
uncertain, she observed, “Aboriginal groups have no legal right to 
manage the forest; their only right is to be consulted, and if appropriate, 
accommodated with respect to the land’s use: Haida. At this stage, the 
Crown may continue to manage the resource in question, but the honour 
of the Crown requires it to respect the potential, but yet unproven 
claims.”19 In her opinion, the British Columbia legislature must have 
intended that lands subject to Aboriginal title claims would be “Crown 
land” within the meaning of the Forest Act,20 “at least until Aboriginal 
title is recognized by a court or an agreement”, as to “proceed otherwise 
would have left no one in charge of the forests that cover hundreds of 
thousands of hectares and represent a resource of enormous value”.21 
After Aboriginal title has been established, the Forest Act would not 
apply because the lands would no longer be vested in the Crown and so 
would no longer be “Crown land”.22 
With all due respect, I am puzzled by McLachlin C.J.C.’s conclusion 
that lands can somehow be vested in the provincial Crown up to the time 
                                                                                                                       
17  Id., at para. 80. See also paras. 89-94. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B 
to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, provides: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” 
18  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157. Chief Justice McLachlin indicated that, since the Court had 
determined that the province had breached its duty to consult and accommodate, it was not necessary 
to deal with the application of the Forest Act, but she went on to address this matter anyway because 
the parties had made extensive submissions on its application and this issue had been “dealt with by 
the courts below and is of pressing importance to the Tsilhqot’in people and other Aboriginal groups 
in British Columbia and elsewhere”: Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at para. 99. 
19  Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at para. 113. 
20  “Crown land” is defined in the Forest Act, s. 1, as having “the same meaning as in the 
Land Act, but does not include land owned by an agent of the government”. In the Land Act, 
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 245, s. 1, “Crown land” is defined as “land, whether or not it is covered by water, 
or an interest in land, vested in the government.” See Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at para. 109. 
21  Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at para. 114. Importantly, as McLachlin C.J.C. based this 
conclusion on interpretation of a specific statute, the same conclusion would not necessarily apply to 
other provincial statutes. 
22  Id., at paras. 111-112, 115-116. 
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title is established, and thereafter be vested in the Aboriginal people 
whose title has been proven. I also wonder how the vesting of Aboriginal 
title can seemingly depend on the intention of a provincial legislature, 
given that Aboriginal title lands are within Parliament’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over “Lands reserved for the Indians”.23 
In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. held that the exclusive occupation of 
land upon which Aboriginal title depends has to be proven at the time of 
Crown sovereignty because “aboriginal title crystallized at the time 
sovereignty was asserted”.24 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Court applied the 
requirement of exclusive occupation at the time of Crown assertion of 
sovereignty.25 Relying on the judgment of Dickson J. (as he then was) in 
Guerin v. Canada,26 McLachlin C.J.C. observed: 
At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired 
radical or underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown 
title, however, was burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of 
Aboriginal people who occupied and used the land prior to European 
arrival. The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior 
to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as 
confirmed by the Royal Proclamation (1763), R.S.C. 1985, App. II, 
No. 1. The Aboriginal interest in land that burdens the Crown’s 
underlying title is an independent legal interest, which gives rise to a 
fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown.27 
So when the Court issued a declaration of Aboriginal title for the 
Tsilhqot’in, it was not creating a title, but rather acknowledging the 
existence of a title that pre-dated European colonization and that had 
crystallized at common law in 1846, the year the Court accepted as the 
time of assertion of Crown sovereignty.28 
Given that Aboriginal title is a pre-existing legal right to land that 
crystallized at the moment of Crown assertion of sovereignty and 
                                                                                                                       
23  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(24). See Delgamuukw, supra, 
note 3, at paras. 173-176. 
24  Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at para. 145. 
25  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 25-66. 
26  [1984] S.C.J. No. 45, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (S.C.C.). 
27  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 69. 
28  Obviously, the role of the courts is not to create rights, but rather to declare and define 
them on the basis of the application of the common law, statutes, etc., to the facts in a given case. In 
a case like Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.), where the House of Lords undoubtedly 
found a new right to exist, their Lordships changed the common law and then declared the right to 
exist on the basis of the changed law. The existence of the right related back to the time liability 
arose on the facts, rather than from the time of the decision forward. See Rupert Cross &  
J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 31-33. 
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continued as a burden on the Crown’s underlying title thereafter, how is 
it possible for that land to be vested in the Crown prior to proof of 
Aboriginal title? In Tsilhqot’in Nation, McLachlin C.J.C. held that the 
“content of the Crown’s underlying title is what is left when Aboriginal 
title is subtracted from it”.29 As Aboriginal titleholders have the right to 
all the benefits flowing from the land,30 she concluded that the Crown’s 
underlying title does not amount to a beneficial interest. Instead, it is 
limited to “a fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal people 
when dealing with Aboriginal lands, and the right to encroach on 
Aboriginal title if the government can justify this in the broader public 
interest under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982”.31 The pre-existing 
nature of Aboriginal title is also confirmed by the same section, which 
recognizes and affirms the “existing aboriginal rights” of the Aboriginal 
peoples. As held in R. v. Sparrow,32 “existing” here means rights that 
were in existence and had not been extinguished prior to the enactment 
of section 35.33 How, one might ask, can a crystallized, beneficial title to 
land be in existence and yet unvested? 
Chief Justice McLachlin seems to have agreed that the Crown’s 
underlying title could not give it a vested interest in Aboriginal title 
land.34 However, her concern was that the large areas of land in British 
Columbia that are subject to Aboriginal title claims could “be immune 
                                                                                                                       
29  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 70. 
30  See quotation at note 4, supra. 
31  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 71. See also paras. 111-112. Although the 
matter cannot be pursued here, in my respectful opinion the power to justifiably infringe Aboriginal 
title is not derived from the Crown’s underlying title, which is a property right provided by s. 109 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867. Instead, this power is legislative in nature and flows from s. 92 of that 
Act, especially s. 92(13) which empowers provincial legislatures to enact laws in relation to 
“Property and Civil Rights in the Province”. See Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at paras. 102-103. 
32  [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, at para. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”]. 
33  In Haida Nation, supra, note 12, at para. 34, McLachlin C.J.C. observed: “The existence 
of a legal duty to consult prior to proof of claims is necessary to understand the language of cases 
like Sparrow [id.], Nikal [R. v. Nikal, [1996] S.C.J. No. 47, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 (S.C.C.)], and 
Gladstone [R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (S.C.C.)], where confirmation 
of the right and justification of an alleged infringement were litigated at the same time. For example, 
the reference in Sparrow to Crown behaviour in determining if any infringements were justified, is 
to behaviour before determination of the right” (emphasis in original). If Aboriginal fishing rights 
exist and can be infringed before determination by a court, surely Aboriginal title must as well. See 
also R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, at para. 28, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Van der Peet”]: “In identifying the basis for the recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights it 
must be remembered that s. 35(1) did not create the legal doctrine of aboriginal rights; aboriginal 
rights existed and were recognized under the common law: Calder v. Attorney-General of British 
Columbia, [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313” [hereinafter “Calder”]. 
34  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 111-112. 
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from forestry regulation” until land claims are resolved if the Forest Act 
does not apply to these lands in the meantime.35 While this is a legitimate 
concern, with all due respect I think that the Chief Justice’s manner of 
resolving it is problematic. As mentioned above, she thought that the 
provincial legislature must have intended the Act to apply to lands where 
Aboriginal title was claimed but unproven because “[t]o hold otherwise 
would be to accept that the legislature intended the forests on such lands 
to be wholly unregulated, and would undercut the premise on which the 
duty to consult affirmed in Haida was based.”36 One has to wonder 
whether the legislature had any such intent, keeping in mind that 
legislative intent does not depend on what was actually in the minds of 
the legislators, but rather on a court’s assessment of the intent as derived 
from the words of the statute and the historical context.37 Instead, given 
the historical denial of the existence of Aboriginal title by the 
government of British Columbia38 and the absence of any reference to 
Aboriginal title in the Forest Act, it is more likely that the legislature 
simply and mistakenly assumed that any lands in the province that were 
not privately owned were Crown lands.39 But surely such an important 
issue as the application of provincial laws to lands under Aboriginal title 
claim should not depend on presumed legislative intent, especially if 
based on a fundamental mistake of law.40 
                                                                                                                       
35  Id., at para. 113. 
36  Id., at para. 115. 
37  See P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed. (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1969), at 1; Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 5-6, 13-14, 315-24; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of 
Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2014), at 269. 
38  Although this denial was called into question by the Supreme Court in Calder, supra, 
note 33, it was not definitively put to rest until the Court’s 1997 decision in Delgamuukw, supra, 
note 3, which came after enactment of the Forest Act. 
39  Perhaps this is what McLachlin C.J.C. had in mind when she stated in Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
supra, note 1, at para. 114, that “[i]t seems clear from the historical record and the record in this case 
that in this evolving context, the British Columbia legislature proceeded on the basis that lands under 
claim remain ‘Crown land’ under the Forest Act, at least until Aboriginal title is recognized by a 
court or an agreement.” 
40  As recently as 2004 in Haida Nation, supra, note 12, at para. 58, the province was still 
arguing that s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, “gives it exclusive right to the land at issue” (i.e., 
the land subject to the Haida Nation’s strong Aboriginal title claim that had been included in tree 
farm licences granted by the Crown). The Court rejected this argument at para. 59 because it had 
been wrong as a matter of law ever since St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen 
(1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.) laid down that the provincial Crown’s s. 109 title is subject to 
Aboriginal title. 
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If Aboriginal title vested at common law at the time of Crown 
assertion of sovereignty,41 that legal reality could not have been altered 
by the British Columbia legislature when it enacted the Forest Act.42 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, while provincial laws of general 
application can apply to Aboriginal people and their lands, the provinces 
cannot legislate directly in relation to “Indians, and Lands reserved for 
the Indians”43 by singling them out for special treatment in a way that 
impairs their status or rights.44 If the provinces cannot explicitly single 
Indians and Indian lands out for special treatment, they cannot do so 
implicitly.45 And yet that is what McLachlin C.J.C. seems to have 
concluded the legislature did when it enacted the Forest Act. As she held, 
private lands are excluded from the Act,46 so Aboriginal title lands  
are the only lands not owned by the Crown that would be implicitly 
included in the Act’s definition of “Crown lands”. As the effect of this 
interpretation would be to bring Aboriginal title lands, and no other lands 
that are not owned by the Crown, within the scope of the Act, this intent 
could cause the definition to cross the line into exclusive federal 
jurisdiction and render it ultra vires the province.47 
                                                                                                                       
41  See text at notes 24-27, supra. 
42  Perhaps McLachlin C.J.C. was suggesting that Aboriginal title could be vested for some 
purposes from the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, but not for others such as application of 
the Forest Act. If so, the result would seem to be that the Aboriginal title interest in forests in British 
Columbia was vested until it became unvested by enactment of that statute. If so, I think this aspect 
of the Forest Act would have to be ultra vires for the reasons outlined in the text following this note. 
43  Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24). 
44  See Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1979] S.C.J. 
No. 138, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.); R. v. Sutherland, [1980] S.C.J. No. 85, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Dick, [1985] S.C.J. No. 62, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dick”]; 
Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at para. 179; Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small 
Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, at para. 67, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146 (S.C.C.);  
R. v. Morris, [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, at para. 41, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morris”]. 
Note that invalidity due to singling out is distinct from reading down due to the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity: see Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supplemented 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at §§ 15.5(b), 15.7-8, 28.2(b)-(c). The latter doctrine will be discussed in 
Part III of this article. 
45  See Dick, id., at para. 30, where Beetz J., relying on R. v. Kruger, [1977] S.C.J. No. 43, 
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kruger”], held unanimously that singling out can be 
either overt or colourable. On the application of the doctrine of colourability in other division-of-
powers contexts, see Ladore v. Bennett, [1939] A.C. 468, at 482; Amax Potash Corp. v. 
Saskatchewan, [1976] S.C.J. No. 86, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576, at 590-91 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amax 
Potash Corp.”]; Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act 1980 (Newfoundland), 
[1984] S.C.J. No. 16, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, at 332 (S.C.C.). 
46  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 109. 
47  See cases cited in note 44, supra, holding that singling out renders provincial laws 
unconstitutional and invalid, whereas provincial laws of general application that are otherwise valid 
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But is McLachlin C.J.C.’s concern that a legal vacuum might result 
if lands subject to unestablished Aboriginal title claims are not within the 
definition of “Crown lands” in the Forest Act justified? In my opinion, 
the issue here is not so much one of legal vacuum as of legal liability. 
The problem is that prior to the establishment of Aboriginal title we just 
don’t know whether these lands are owned by the Crown or by the 
Aboriginal claimants. The Court’s way of addressing this uncertainty in 
Haida Nation was to implicitly presume that the lands are Crown lands 
and that the Forest Act applies,48 but to impose a duty on the Crown to 
consult the Aboriginal claimants and accommodate their interests in 
appropriate circumstances. But once title is established, any prior action 
in relation to the land taken or authorized by the Crown without the 
consent of the Aboriginal claimants could amount to an unjustifiable 
infringement of Aboriginal title.49 I think the Court was striving to avoid 
this result in Tsilhqot’in Nation by interpreting the Forest Act so that 
Aboriginal title in relation to forests would only vest when proven, 
thereby potentially protecting the province from liability for prior 
unjustifiable infringements. 
Given that the Court seems to have taken for granted in Haida 
Nation that Crown title and jurisdiction are presumed prior to proof of 
Aboriginal title, there is no legal vacuum in this context. If the province 
grants timber harvesting rights to a corporation without Aboriginal 
consent and Aboriginal title is subsequently proven, the presumptions of 
Crown title and jurisdiction would then be rebutted. As a result, the  
grant of harvesting rights should be invalid. In Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
McLachlin C.J.C. envisaged just this kind of scenario: 
Once title is established, it may be necessary for the Crown to reassess 
prior conduct in light of the new reality in order to faithfully discharge 
its fiduciary duty to the title-holding group going forward. For 
                                                                                                                       
are not ultra vires, but might have to be read down so as not to impair Indian status or capacity: see 
Hogg, supra, note 44, at § 28.2(b)-(c). 
48  This interpretation could perhaps be supported by the presumption of constitutionality of 
legislation in the context of division of powers: see Kruger, supra, note 45, at 112; Reference re 
Firearms Act (Canada), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, at para. 25, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.); Siemens v. 
Manitoba (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 69, at para. 33, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6 (S.C.C.). See 
Joseph Eliot Magnet, “The Presumption of Constitutionality” (1980) 18 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87; Hogg, 
supra, note 44, at § 15.5(i). 
49  See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights, Resource Development, and the Source of the 
Provincial Duty to Consult in Haida Nation and Taku River” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 447, at 460. 
See also note 33, supra. In R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 
(S.C.C.), the Court declared an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic purposes to exist, and 
accepted at para. 54 that it had been infringed by provincial legislation before the case went to trial. 
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example, if the Crown begins a project without consent prior to 
Aboriginal title being established, it may be required to cancel the 
project upon establishment of the title if continuation of the project 
would be unjustifiably infringing. Similarly, if legislation was validly 
enacted before title was established, such legislation may be rendered 
inapplicable going forward to the extent that it unjustifiably infringes 
Aboriginal title.50 
So McLachlin C.J.C. contemplated situations where the provincial 
legislation could be rendered inapplicable after proof of title, but by 
including the words “going forward” she evidently meant to preserve the 
legality of what had been done previously. But what difference does it 
make whether legislation governing the grant of a forestry licence, for 
instance, is rendered inapplicable from the time Aboriginal title is proven 
or beforehand? What happens to that licence at the time Aboriginal title 
is declared? If the legislation authorizing the grant of the licence and its 
operation is inapplicable going forward because it unjustifiably infringes 
the title, surely the grant would be invalid from that time forward as well. 
The Court’s main concern obviously relates to the period prior to 
proof of title.51 As suggested above, the issue here is really liability, as 
there would be no legal vacuum as long as provincial title and 
jurisdiction are presumed. If provincial laws that infringe Aboriginal title 
are rendered inapplicable only after Aboriginal title is proven, then 
actions taken under authority of those laws prior to that time apparently 
could have been legal even if they unjustifiably infringed Aboriginal 
title.52 If this is correct, the province and the recipients of Crown grants 
                                                                                                                       
50  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 92 (emphasis added). 
51  Id., especially paras. 113-115. 
52  See, however, British Columbia Power Corp. v. British Columbia Electric Co., [1962] S.C.J. 
No. 48, [1962] S.C.R. 642 (S.C.C.), and Amax Potash Corp., supra, note 45. In those cases, the Supreme 
Court decided that a province cannot escape liability for actions taken pursuant to legislation subsequently 
held to be unconstitutional. In the former case, Kerwin C.J.C. stated at 644: “In a federal system, where 
legislative authority is divided, as are also the prerogatives of the Crown, as between the Dominion and the 
Provinces, it is my view that it is not open to the Crown, either in right of Canada or of a Province, to claim 
a Crown immunity based upon an interest in certain property, where its very interest in that property 
depends completely and solely on the validity of the legislation which it has itself passed, if there is a 
reasonable doubt as to whether such legislation is constitutionally valid.” British Columbia Power Corp. 
was followed by Maclean J.A. in his concurring judgment in Canex Placer Ltd. v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), [1975] B.C.J. No. 1155, 58 D.L.R. (3d) 241 (B.C.C.A.). See also Law Society of 
British Columbia v. Canada (Attorney General), [1978] B.C.J. No. 359, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 53 (B.C.S.C.), affd 
[1980] B.C.J. No. 1949, 108 D.L.R. (3d) 753 (B.C.C.A.), affd [1982] S.C.J. No. 70, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 
(S.C.C.). Compare Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 91, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347 
(S.C.C.); Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, [2002] 1 S.C.J. No. 13, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.), neither of which involved assertion of a property right by the Crown. 
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of resources on Aboriginal title lands might not be liable for removal of 
resources from Aboriginal title lands prior to proof of title. This can’t be 
right. Taking the Forest Act as an example, consider a parallel situation 
where a private landowner and the Crown are in dispute over title to a 
particular parcel of land. The Crown proceeds on the assumption that it 
owns the land and grants harvesting rights to a forestry company, and the 
company proceeds to harvest timber. The individual claiming title goes 
to court and obtains a declaration of title in her favour. As a result, the 
Forest Act would not have applied to the land at the time of the grant to 
the forestry company,53 and so the grant would have been invalid from 
the outset and the province and the company would probably both be 
liable to the landowner for infringement of her property rights.54 Why 
should the result be any different when the titleholder is an Aboriginal 
group rather than a private individual? Moreover, how can the result be 
different as a result of judicial attribution of intention to a provincial 
legislature when the result would be colourable singling out of 
Aboriginal people and their lands for discriminatory treatment? 
In the Conclusion to this article we will return to this issue and 
suggest an approach that also takes account of our discussion in Part III 
of the application of provincial laws to Aboriginal title lands after title 
has been established. 
III. APPLICATION OF PROVINCIAL LAWS AFTER ABORIGINAL TITLE 
HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED 
As McLachlin C.J.C. acknowledged, the Supreme Court had 
previously sent mixed messages regarding provincial authority to 
infringe Aboriginal rights, including title.55 In Delgamuukw, for example, 
Lamer C.J.C. stated that the provinces can infringe Aboriginal title as 
long as the infringement can be justified using the test laid down by the 
                                                                                                                       
53  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 109. 
54  As the Crown cannot grant what it does not have, the grant to the forestry company 
would have been void and any entry and harvesting of timber would have been trespass: see Case of 
Alton Woods (1600), 1 Co. R. 40b, at 44a (K.B.); Sir Oliver Butler’s Case (1681), 2 Ventr. 344 at 
344 (Ch.), affd (1685), 3 Lev. 220 (H.L.); Alcock v. Cooke (1829), 5 Bing. 340, at 348 (C.P.); 
Bristow v. Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641 (H.L.); Attorney-General for the Isle of Man v. 
Mylchreest (1879), 4 App. Cas. 294 (P.C.); City of Vancouver v. Vancouver Lumber Co., [1911] 
A.C. 711, at 721 (P.C.). 
55  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 35-38. 
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Court in Sparrow.56 However, elsewhere in Delgamuukw he said that 
Aboriginal title is within the core of Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction 
over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”,57 and so has been 
protected since Confederation against extinguishment by provincial laws 
by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.58 Then in Morris,59 the 
Supreme Court held (unanimously on this point) that non-commercial 
treaty rights to hunt are within the core of federal jurisdiction over 
“Indians” and thus are protected from infringing provincial laws by 
interjurisdictional immunity. As Justice Vickers held at trial in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation,60 if treaty rights are so protected, Aboriginal title 
must have equivalent protection. But in a striking reversal, the Supreme 
Court held in Tsilhqot’in Nation that the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity no longer applies to Aboriginal rights, including title. “To the 
extent that Morris stands for the proposition that provincial governments 
are categorically barred from regulating the exercise of Aboriginal rights,” 
McLachlin C.J.C. stated, “it should no longer be followed”.61 In the 
modern era, she continued, Aboriginal rights are adequately protected by 
constitutional recognition and affirmation of these rights in section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982,62 “which directly addresses the requirement 
that these interests must be respected by the government, unless the 
government can justify incursion on them for a compelling purpose and in 
conformity with its fiduciary duty to affected Aboriginal groups”.63 
In my opinion, the Court’s rejection of the application of division-of-
powers protection through the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
needs to be qualified.64 In discussing this matter, McLachlin C.J.C. 
                                                                                                                       
56  Supra, note 32. See Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at para. 160. For critical commentary, 
see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial 
Jurisdiction” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431, republished in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice?, supra, 
note 9, at 249; Kerry Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22 Dalhousie L.J. 185. 
57  Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24). 
58  Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at paras. 177-178, 181. 
59  Supra, note 44. 
60  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2465, at paras. 1021-1032, 
[2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 112 (B.C.S.C.). See Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 132-133. 
61  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 150. Two weeks later, in Grassy Narrows First 
Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), [2014] S.C.J. No. 48, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447 (S.C.C.), the 
Court applied this aspect of Tsilhqot’in Nation and held at para. 53 that “the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity does not preclude the Province from justifiably infringing treaty rights”, 
effectively overruling this aspect of Morris, supra, note 44. 
62  Supra, note 17. 
63  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 138-152, quotation at para. 152. 
64  In addition to the analysis in the text, it should be emphasized that the Court’s rejection 
of the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity cannot have been intended to be 
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consistently referred to “regulation” of these rights by provincial laws. 
For example, she stated: 
Provincial laws of general application, including the Forest Act, should 
apply unless they are unreasonable, impose a hardship or deny the title 
holders their preferred means of exercising their rights, and such 
restrictions cannot be justified pursuant to the justification framework 
outlined above. The result is a balance that preserves the Aboriginal 
right while permitting effective regulation of forests by the province, as 
required by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.65 
So provincial forestry laws could apply to govern harvesting of 
timber on Aboriginal title lands by the Aboriginal titleholders 
themselves, either because these laws would not infringe the titleholders’ 
rights or because the infringement could be justified.66 However, the 
Aboriginal titleholders’ rights to the timber on their lands would not be 
preserved if the province had the authority to grant licences to private 
individuals or corporations to harvest timber there, even if this could 
somehow be justified under the Sparrow test.67 The distinction between 
governmental regulation and taking is well established in expropriation 
law,68 and was acknowledged by McLachlin C.J.C. in Tsilhqot’in Nation: 
                                                                                                                       
retroactive. In her discussion of this issue, McLachlin C.J.C. made it very clear that the reason why 
the doctrine is no longer applicable to Aboriginal and treaty rights is because those rights are now 
adequately protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the justifiable infringement test. As 
those protections were not in place prior to the enactment of s. 35, the protection afforded by the 
division of powers and interjurisdictional immunity should still have impeded provincial authority to 
infringe prior to 1982. See Dick, supra, note 44, a case involving Aboriginal hunting rights that arose 
before the enactment of s. 35, where the Court expressed the view that, if on the facts the hunting 
was within the “core of Indianness” of the Aboriginal people in question, provincial game laws 
could not apply because they would impinge on the federal jurisdiction over “Indians” provided by  
s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at para. 152, McLachlin C.J.C., 
referring to situations outside of the context of s. 35 (which would include the Dick case) said that 
“conflict between the federal and provincial levels of government [can be] appropriately dealt with 
by the doctrines of paramountcy and interjurisdictional immunity where precedent supports this.” It 
can also be argued that, right up to the Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, interjurisdictional 
immunity continued to apply to Aboriginal and treaty rights, as that was the state of the law laid 
down in Morris, supra, note 44, in relation to treaty rights — and by extension to Aboriginal rights — 
before that aspect of Morris was overruled by Tsilhqot’in Nation. 
65  Tsilhqot’in Nation, id., at para. 151 (emphasis added). 
66  Id., at paras. 105, 118-127. 
67  Even if justifiable, it is important to realize that the cost to the province might be 
prohibitive. The Sparrow test requires governments to pay compensation for infringements that have 
an economic impact on Aboriginal title: Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at para. 169. In the current 
context, the cost to the province of compensating the Aboriginal titleholders for timber removed 
from their lands would probably exceed the benefits, leaving taxpayers on the hook. 
68  See Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] N.S.J. No. 283, 
177 D.L.R. (4th) 696 (N.S.C.A.); Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City), [2006] S.C.J. 
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“General regulatory legislation, which may affect the manner in which 
the Aboriginal right can be exercised, differs from legislation that assigns 
Aboriginal property rights to third parties.”69 She nonetheless regarded 
such transfers of property rights as potentially justifiable: “The issuance 
of timber licences on Aboriginal title land for example — a direct 
transfer of Aboriginal property rights to a third party — will plainly be a 
meaningful diminution in the Aboriginal group’s ownership right and 
will amount to an infringement that must be justified in cases where it is 
done without Aboriginal consent.”70 
Standing timber is part of the land, as are minerals that have not been 
severed by mining — both belong to Aboriginal titleholders as incidents 
of their title.71 When a private landowner has mineral rights, a taking of 
those rights by the Crown amounts to expropriation, which requires 
statutory authority and payment of full compensation.72 Similarly, a grant 
by the Crown of a timber cutting licence on privately owned land would 
require statutory authority and would amount to expropriation of the 
timber.73 However, this situation does not currently arise in British 
Columbia because the provincial Forest Act does not apply to private 
land; it only applies to “Crown land” and “Crown timber”.74 Likewise, in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation the Court held that, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the Forest Act does not apply to Aboriginal title land and 
the timber thereon once title is established because they are not “Crown 
land” and “Crown timber”.75 Nonetheless, McLachlin C.J.C. said it was 
                                                                                                                       
No. 5, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 277 (S.C.C.). More generally, see Eric C.E. Todd, The Law of Expropriation 
and Compensation in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992). 
69  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 124. 
70  Id. See also para. 127. Compare the dissenting judgment of McLachlin J. (as she then 
was) in Van der Peet, supra, note 33, at paras. 314-316, where she characterized such transfers as 
“unconstitutional”. For discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally 
Protected Property Right” in Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of 
the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2000), 55, 
republished in McNeil, Emerging Justice?, supra, note 9, at 292 [hereinafter “McNeil, 
‘Constitutionally Protected Property Right’”]. 
71  See Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 116; Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at 
paras. 119-124. 
72  See British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] S.C.J. No. 25, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 (S.C.C.). 
73  Any taking of private property by the Crown requires clear and plain statutory authority: 
see Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.); Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord 
Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L.); Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board, 
[1933] S.C.J. No. 54, [1933] S.C.R. 629, at 638 (S.C.C.); Attorney-General for Canada v. Hallet & 
Carey Ltd., [1952] A.C. 427, especially at 450 (P.C.); R. v. Colet, [1981] S.C.J. No. 2, [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 2, at 10 (S.C.C.). 
74  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 109. See note 20, supra. 
75  Id., at para. 116. 
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obvious that “it remains open to the legislature to amend the Act to cover 
lands held under Aboriginal title, provided it observes applicable 
constitutional restraints.”76 
So what are these constitutional restraints? First, of course, there is 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.77 As McLachlin C.J.C. outlined 
in her judgment, any infringement of Aboriginal title by the application 
of an amended Forest Act, especially the granting of cutting licences to 
private companies, would have to be justified.78 Second, there is division 
of powers and the impact of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 
1867.79 As we have seen, McLachlin C.J.C. ruled that the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity no longer applies in the context of 
provincial infringement of section 35 Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
However, in Delgamuukw Lamer C.J.C. held that the federal 
government’s exclusive section 91(24) jurisdiction over “Indians, and 
Lands reserved for the Indians” means that, even before section 35 was 
enacted in 1982, the provinces did not have the authority to extinguish 
Aboriginal title.80 He gave two reasons. Taking his second reason first, 
he said that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity protects 
Aboriginal title from extinguishment by provincial laws of general 
application because Aboriginal title is within the core of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction.81 As McLachlin C.J.C. in Tsilhqot’in Nation only 
envisaged infringement, not extinguishment, of Aboriginal title by 
provincial laws, she does not appear to have overruled this aspect of 
Lamer C.J.C.’s decision.82 
Chief Justice Lamer’s second reason why provincial laws could 
never extinguish Aboriginal title was that extinguishment requires “clear 
and plain” legislative intent, and any provincial law with sufficient intent 
to extinguish would cross the line into federal jurisdiction. This reason 
does not depend on interjurisdictional immunity. It arises instead from 
the constitutional rule discussed in Part II of this article that provincial 
laws that single out “Indians” or “Lands reserved for the Indians” for 
                                                                                                                       
76  Id. 
77  Supra, note 17. 
78  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 117-127. 
79  Supra, note 23. 
80  Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at paras. 172-181. 
81  Id., at para. 181. 
82  She could not have envisaged extinguishment because, since the enactment of s. 35 in 
1982, neither the provincial legislatures nor Parliament can unilaterally extinguish Aboriginal rights: 
Van der Peet, supra, note 33, at para. 28; Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – M.N.R.), 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 33, at para. 11, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.). 
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special treatment are not laws of general application — they are laws in 
relation to those subject matters and so are ultra vires and invalid.83 
Chief Justice Lamer put it this way: 
My concern is that the only laws with the sufficiently clear and plain 
intention to extinguish aboriginal rights would be laws in relation to 
Indians and Indian lands. As a result, a provincial law could never, 
proprio vigore, extinguish aboriginal rights, because the intention to do 
so would take the law outside provincial jurisdiction.84 
The issue of invalidity of provincial laws for singling out Aboriginal 
title lands was not addressed at all by McLachlin C.J.C. in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation. However, one has to wonder how the provincial legislature could 
amend the Forest Act so that it would apply to Aboriginal title lands 
without singling those lands out for special treatment, which established 
case law has indicated would be ultra vires the province.85 In theory it 
might be possible for the province to amend the Act so that it applies 
more broadly, making the amendment a law of general application by 
extending the definitions of “lands” and “timber” to all lands and timber 
in the province, but one can imagine the political outcry from private 
landowners if that were done, especially if it gave the province the 
authority to grant timber harvesting licences on private land to forestry 
companies, which is one sort of infringement that McLachlin C.J.C. 
envisaged. Private landowners do have to accept regulation of their land 
rights by zoning laws, building codes, environmental protection laws, 
and so on.86 In some situations, legislation also permits expropriation of 
private lands for public purposes, such as construction of roads and 
airports.87 However, expropriation of natural resources from private 
lands for the benefit of private corporations, some of which may be 
foreign owned, is an entirely different matter that British Columbians, 
and Canadians generally, would be unlikely to tolerate. So amending the 
Forest Act in the way McLachlin C.J.C. seems to have envisaged may 
not be a simple matter. 
There is, however, a more fundamental issue here: why should 
Aboriginal titleholders be subject to governmental expropriation of the 
resources from their lands for the benefit of privately owned corporations 
                                                                                                                       
83  See text accompanying notes 43-47, supra. 
84  Delgamuukw, supra, note 3, at para. 180. 
85  See cases cited in note 44, supra. 
86  See cases cited in note 68, supra. 
87  See Todd, supra, note 68. 
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when private landowners are not? This is all the more troubling when 
one takes into account the fact that Aboriginal land rights are 
constitutionally protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
whereas the land rights of other Canadians are not.88 In my respectful 
opinion, the Supreme Court went too far in Tsilhqot’in Nation if it meant 
to suggest that British Columbia could amend the Forest Act to permit 
the province to grant timber harvesting rights on Aboriginal title lands to 
privately owned corporations. I think a preferable approach would 
involve a compromise position that would permit provincial regulatory 
laws to infringe Aboriginal title rights for purposes such as 
environmental protection and control of pests like the pine beetle, but 
would not allow the expropriation of the resources from Aboriginal title 
lands, either for the benefit of the province or of private parties. One way 
to do this would be to apply the distinction in expropriation law between 
regulation and taking. As we have seen, regulation of private land rights 
involves zoning laws, building codes, and the like. Expropriation 
involves government taking of private land or of the resources from the 
land, thereby extinguishing the property rights to those lands or 
resources. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. made clear that, ever since 
Confederation, the provinces have not been able to extinguish Aboriginal 
title, not just because of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, but 
also because that would be ultra vires the provinces. So by regarding the 
taking of resources from Aboriginal title lands as extinguishment rather 
than infringement of the rights to those resources, one can accord the 
provinces authority to regulate Aboriginal lands while denying them the 
authority to expropriate the resources from them. 
Provincial authority to regulate Aboriginal lands and resources 
cannot, however, be taken for granted. If the regulation infringes 
Aboriginal title rights, it has to be justified under the test that the Court 
apparently made even more stringent in Tsilhqot’in Nation.89 Chief 
Justice McLachlin did observe that “[g]eneral regulatory legislation, such 
as legislation aimed at managing the forests in a way that deals with pest 
invasions or prevents forest fires, will often pass the Sparrow test as it 
will be reasonable, not impose undue hardship, and not deny the holders 
                                                                                                                       
88  Before the Constitution Act, 1982 was enacted, this matter was debated and a conscious 
political decision was made not to include protection of private property rights in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: see Jean McBean, “The Implications of Entrenching Property 
Rights in Section 7 of the Charter of Rights” (1988) 26 Alta. L. Rev. 548. See also McNeil, 
“Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, supra, note 70. 
89  Supra, note 1, at paras. 77-88, 118-127. 
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of the right their preferred means of exercising it. In such cases, no 
infringement will result.”90 However, she did not take account of the 
impact of Aboriginal law and self-government in this context.91 In 
situations where Aboriginal peoples have their own laws governing the 
management of resources such as forests on their lands, there would be 
no reason for provincial laws to apply unless the Aboriginal laws were 
determined on the facts to be inadequate to meet the valid legislative 
objectives behind the provincial laws.92 In my opinion, the onus of 
proving that Aboriginal title lands are not adequately managed by Aboriginal 
laws would be on the province because the right to use Aboriginal law can 
also be regarded as a constitutionally protected Aboriginal right,93 any 
infringement of which by imposition of provincial law would require 
justification.94 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The application of provincial laws to Aboriginal title lands has 
been a matter of considerable uncertainty and controversy ever since 
the Supreme Court ruled definitively in Delgamuukw that these lands 
are under exclusive federal jurisdiction as section 91(24) “Lands 
reserved for the Indians”. In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Court addressed 
this matter head on in order to provide badly needed clarity to the 
                                                                                                                       
90  Id., at para. 123. 
91  See A. Boisselle, “To Dignity Through the Back Door: Tsilhqot’in and the Aboriginal 
Title Test” (in this volume); British Columbia Treaty Commission Annual Report 2014, online: 
<http://www.bctreaty.net/files/pdf_documents/BCTC-Annual-Report-2014.pdf>, at 26. 
92  The first part of the test for valid infringement of Aboriginal rights laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Sparrow, supra, note 32, requires the Crown to prove a valid legislative objective. 
See Kent McNeil, “Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments” (1993) 19 
Queen’s L.J. 95 at 133-36, republished in McNeil, Emerging Justice?, supra, note 9, 184 at 211-13. 
93  See Casimel v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1834, [1994] 2 
C.N.L.R. 22 (B.C.C.A.), where the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the Carrier People 
have a constitutional right to rely on their own customary adoption laws. See also Manychief v. 
Poffenroth, [1994] A.J. No. 907, [1995] 2 C.N.L.R. 67 (Alta. Q.B.). In Campbell v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), [2000] B.C.J. No. 1524, [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.), Williamson J. held that 
Aboriginal titleholders’ decision-making authority over their lands is inherent and governmental. 
This decision was followed in House of Sga’nisim v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] B.C.J.  
No. 1940, [2012] 2 C.N.L.R. 82 (B.C.S.C.), but in that case Smith J. held as well that the 
governmental authority in the Nisga’a Final Agreement, 1998, the validity of which was challenged 
in both these cases, could also be valid as delegated authority. Justice Smith’s decision was upheld 
on the latter basis, without deciding the inherent right issue: [2013] B.C.J. No. 179, [2013] 2 
C.N.L.R. 226 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 144 (S.C.C.). 
94  The onus of proving that infringement of an Aboriginal right is justified is on the Crown: 
Sparrow, supra, note 32. 
86 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
law. In doing so, however, I respectfully think the Court overlooked 
some important considerations. 
In regard to the application of provincial laws prior to proof of 
Aboriginal title in court or acknowledgment thereof in a land claims 
agreement, the Court assumed there would be a legal vacuum if the 
British Columbia Forest Act in particular were not interpreted so that the 
term “Crown lands” in the Act includes lands subject to unestablished 
Aboriginal title claims. In my opinion, this interpretation involves a 
strained attempt to attribute a non-existent intention to the provincial 
legislature. But if the intention was to include these lands in the 
definition of “Crown lands”, this would be ultra vires the province 
because it would be a colourable attempt to single these lands out for 
unfavourable, discriminatory treatment. Not only that, but as this 
attribution of intention relates only to a specific provincial statute, the 
Court’s approach does not tell us whether other provincial statutes apply 
to these lands. Each statute that might apply would have to be assessed 
separately on the basis of the legislative intention behind it, with 
uncertain results. This is not a workable solution to the legal vacuum the 
Court was striving to avoid. 
In my view, the Court’s fear of a legal vacuum is unjustified. Given 
that Crown title and provincial jurisdiction are presumed, all relevant 
provincial laws would presumptively apply prior to establishment of 
Aboriginal title.95 In situations where Aboriginal title is subsequently 
acknowledged in a land claims agreement, problems arising from the 
application of provincial laws prior thereto could be dealt with in the 
negotiations. Where Aboriginal title is declared by a court, as in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, the presumption of Crown title and jurisdiction would 
be rebutted. As would be the case regarding any land which the Crown 
mistakenly thought it owned, the Crown and its grantees should be liable 
to the Aboriginal titleholders for any actions that infringed their rights 
prior to the declaration of title. 
A concern might be raised that fear of liability would impede 
resource development in British Columbia, and elsewhere in Canada 
such as the Maritime Provinces where Aboriginal title claims are 
unresolved, if the Crown and resource companies could be held liable for 
actions taken prior to declarations of Aboriginal title. I think this concern 
is largely unfounded. The reality is that most Aboriginal title claims will 
                                                                                                                       
95  Of course, the application of these laws would be subject to the Crown’s duty to consult 
and accommodate in appropriate circumstances: see text at notes 13-17, supra. 
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be resolved through agreements, not through litigation,96 so any 
compensation for past incursions on settlement lands can be dealt with in 
the negotiations. Where negotiations do not take place or fail, the Crown 
can assess the risk on the basis of the strength of the Aboriginal title 
claims,97 and companies can seek indemnity guarantees from the 
province or take out insurance. In areas where claims are weak, the risk 
may be small. Where claims are strong, the province should either obtain 
the consent of the Aboriginal claimants before proceeding or abstain 
from actions that could give rise to claims for compensation.98 We know 
from Haida Nation that Aboriginal consent is not necessary where 
Aboriginal title claims are unproven,99 but this should not allow the 
Crown to escape liability for incursions on Aboriginal title lands any 
more than it would if the lands were privately owned.100 
After a declaration of Aboriginal title, the province must either get 
the consent of the Aboriginal titleholders for any incursions on their land 
or be able to justify infringement of their rights.101 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
McLachlin C.J.C. suggested that provincial regulatory laws to prevent 
forest fires or control pests such as pine beetles would probably apply 
without infringing Aboriginal title, but of course this would depend on 
the laws in question and the factual circumstances. However, the Chief 
Justice does not seem to have taken into account the relevance of 
Aboriginal laws in this context. Where Aboriginal titleholders have 
adequate laws of their own governing such matters,102 application of 
                                                                                                                       
96  See British Columbia Treaty Commission Annual Report 2014, supra, note 91, at 26. 
After all, it took 40 years from the time the Supreme Court in Calder, supra, note 33, first 
acknowledged that Aboriginal title is a legal right for the first declaration of title to be issued in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1. 
97  Assessment of legal risk is an essential element of a lawyer’s job, and Crown lawyers 
should be as capable of doing so as any lawyers. 
98  From an economic perspective, the cost to the province of defending against and paying 
compensation for strong claims would, in most cases, be greater than the benefit it would receive 
from resource development. 
99  Haida Nation, supra, note 12, at para. 48. 
100  In assessing compensation, a court might take into account accommodation measures 
taken by the Crown in fulfilling its pre-proof duty to consult and accommodate. 
101  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, especially at paras. 76, 90. 
102  On March 19, 2015, the Tsilhqot’in enacted their own law governing their Aboriginal title 
lands, affirming the Nemiah Declaration of August 23, 1989: see Tsilhqot’in National Government Press 
Release, “Tsilhqot’in Nation affirms law for title land”, March 20, 2015, online: <http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/ 
PDFs/Press%20Releases/2015%2003%2020_XeniDeclaration.pdf>. The Nemiah Declaration can be 
found online: <http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/PDFs/Nemiah_Declaration.pdf>. 
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provincial laws relating thereto should be excluded.103 Ideally, as 
McLachlin C.J.C. expressed, “it is to be hoped that Aboriginal groups 
and the provincial government will work cooperatively to sustain the 
natural environment so important to them both.”104 This will require 
respect by the province for the governance authority of Aboriginal 
peoples that has been sadly lacking in the past. But failing the kind of co-
operation the Chief Justice hopes for, one can anticipate litigation to 
determine which laws are paramount where Aboriginal laws and 
provincial laws governing Aboriginal title lands come into conflict. 
As McLachlin C.J.C. noted in Tsilhqot’in Nation, laws regulating 
land use are one thing, and laws authorizing transfer of the natural 
resources on Aboriginal title lands to private individuals or corporations 
are quite another. In my opinion, such transfers should never be 
justifiable, but I would go further. Even if the provincial legislature could 
amend existing statutes so as to authorize transfers of resources on 
Aboriginal title lands without singling those lands out for special 
discriminatory treatment (which I think is extremely doubtful), such 
transfers would extinguish the titleholders’ rights to those resources. As 
Lamer C.J.C. held in Delgamuukw and McLachlin C.J.C. did not 
question in Tsilhqot’in Nation, since Confederation the provinces have 
lacked the authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights for division-of-
powers reasons. Any provincial attempt to authorize such transfers 
should therefore be ultra vires. 
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, McLachlin C.J.C. admitted that the Court did 
not need to deal with the issue of the application of provincial laws to 
Aboriginal title lands, as it found on the facts that the Crown had 
breached its duty to consult with the Tsilhqot’in and accommodate their 
interests.105 Strictly speaking, the Court’s analysis of this issue is 
therefore obiter. While lower courts might still be expected to follow this 
aspect of the judgment,106 the fact that the Chief Justice explicitly stated 
that her treatment of this issue was not necessary to the decision may 
have been intended to provide the Supreme Court with flexibility. As we 
                                                                                                                       
103  See Kent McNeil, “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (West 
Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2007), online: <http://fngovernance. 
org/ncfng_research/kent_mcneil.pdf>, at 25-31. 
104  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 105. 
105  Id., at paras. 95, 98-99. See note 18, supra. 
106  See R. v. Sellars, [1980] S.C.J. No. 9, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.). Compare R. v. 
Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, at paras. 52-59, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, at paras. 38-46, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Bedford”]. 
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have seen, in this area of the law the Court has been willing to change 
direction quite dramatically, as it did when it decided in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation that its unanimous ruling just eight years earlier in Morris on the 
application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity should no 
longer be followed in the context of section 35 rights.107 One can 
therefore be optimistic that in future cases the Court will reconsider 
problematic aspects of its decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation on the 
application of provincial laws to Aboriginal title lands. 
                                                                                                                       
107  Recently, the Court has also been willing to change direction where prostitution and 
assisted suicide are concerned: see Bedford, id.; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. 
No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.). 
 
